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THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF AN 
ENTERPRISE’S COLLECTIVE AGENCY
abstract
What is the political dimension of an enterprise if it is taken as a collective agent? Referring to political 
collective agency, we can’t ignore the case of enterprises. Indeed, they have a collective agency, as we 
firstly point out in this article. The collective agency of the enterprise impacts the world in different ways 
that we secondly consider in this article. Enterprises have an impact on states, on citizens, on health, on 
the environment. They have an impact on employment and on the economy. As such, they contribute 
to the life of society. In the same way, law impacts them, but also consumers’ choices and local socio-
economic context. In fact, enterprises must be concerned by corporate social responsibility, they have 
to care about human’s commons and this is a political issue without borders: it is today a prominent 
political question of equity for the citizen of the world. 
I offer an ontological account of political collective agency applied to the enterprise. According to this 
account, an enterprise is a specific kind of social object, which has several intrinsic properties. Put 
together these properties enable the enterprise to act as a group with a definite political significance.
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Referring to political collective agency, we cannot ignore the case of enterprises. What is 
the political dimension of an enterprise if it is taken as a collective agent? In this paper, we 
would like to show first that enterprises have a collective agency. More precisely, with List 
and Pettit, we defend the logical possibility of the group-agent. Then, we analyse the type of 
responsibility of a corporate agent. In particular, we investigate the link between a company 
and its stakeholders. Finally, the enterprise’s political role is analysed on the basis of the 
question of the commons. 
What is an enterprise? In my article, I propose an ontological account of this question. 
According to this approach, an enterprise is a social object, which has several intrinsic 
properties. Regarding the political aspect, the most important one is its agency. 
Does the group have a specific identity or does it have the identity of its parts? The answer 
to this question is very important because it helps to understand the behaviour of firms and 
states as “corporate agents” in the political sphere. This issue is at the heart of legal and 
philosophical theories, and it is central regarding economic and social problems.
Depending on the answer to this initial question, the responsibility of the enterprise is not 
considered in the same way.
Several positions exist:
1) The individual / the part takes precedence over the whole.
The primacy of the individual over the entity is named a “methodological individualism”. That 
means it is based on a paradigm of social sciences according to which collective phenomena 
can (and must) be described and explained from the properties and actions of individuals and 
their mutual interactions (bottom-up approach). Thus Coleman, for naming the group, speaks 
about “multi-agents” system. This multi-agent system leads to the tenet that the decision 
/ action of the collectivity reflects (more or less clearly) the overall decisions / actions of 
individuals (Coleman, 1990). 
Thus considered, the group can always be reduced to its parts. Peter French explains that the 
intentions of the company are always reducible to human intentions (French, 1977, paragraph 4). 
From an ethical point of view, this position suggests that collective responsibility is reduced to 
individual responsibility. This position amounts to consider that there is no responsibility of 
the group.
Introduction
1. The enterprise’s 
collective agency
1.1 The identity of 




2) Singular identity of the group exists.
The second position is to consider that there is a singular identity of the group. It has a 
distinctive reality from the individuals that make up the group. This position leads to 
recognize that the group-agent responsibility and individual responsibilities are distinct.
The position exposed here corresponds more to this second point of view, which gives a 
singular and autonomous place to the existence of the group. This position allows us to deal 
further with the company’s responsibility as a group-agent. That being said, we wish to 
underline the idea that the group exists independently of its parts. However it is important to 
consider that within this entity the identity and individual responsibility exist as well. Finally, 
there are articulations and mutual influences between the group and the individuals.
How to argue in favor of the singular existence of the group?
A second way to defend the existence of the group is to demonstrate the logical possibility of 
the group’s existence. For this purpose we have to start from the intrinsic properties of the 
agency.
List and Pettit (List & Pettit, 2011) base the demonstration on a robot for determining the 
basic conditions of agency. So, to be an agent with basic agentive properties you need: to 
have representational states of the environment, to have a motivational state that specifies 
the things needed by the environment, to be able to rely on these two previous states (which 
correspond to an “intentional” state) to intervene properly on the environment.
Agentivity is limited by the physical potentials of the robot. However, the scope of the agency 
can be improved, in the case of humans or animals (or possibly a complex robot) and in this 
case, actions become less predictable. As far as the humans being are concerned, they do 
have have a binary answer to what they perceive from the world. As a result, his beliefs and 
desires are nuanced. They have degrees of belief, satisfaction, and preference. The proposals 
and attitudes of humans are complex and humans can consider complex scenarii, conditional, 
variable contingencies and projects in the future. To interpret and anticipate the reactions of 
an agent, we must model not one or two hypotheses, but several. The precise definition of the 
agent helps to limit the assumptions.
There are four conditions to speak of a group where the intention is common to all the 
members: a shared goal, individual contributions to achieve the goal, interdependence (each 
one formulates its intentions partly because they believe that others share these intentions), 
and a common consciousness. The common intention allows joint action. But how a multi-
member group can go from a multiplicity of dispositions (or “attitudes”), to a unique goal 
approved by the whole group members? To answer this question, List and Pettit introduce 
the concept of “aggregative function” which is a vector starting from individual dispositions 
toward the emergence of a group aim. The joint commitments formed required for the group’s 
emergence is simple according to Margaret Gilbert :
How are joint commitments formed? To put it very generally, in a situation where there are 
no special background understandings, each person must express to the others that he is in 
a certain broadly speaking mental state, such that common knowledge among them that all 
have made the appropriate expres- sions suffices to create a joint commitment of them all. I 
refer to this state as “readiness” for joint commitment. As to common knowledge, suffice it to 
say that the expressions in question must be “out in the open” as far as the parties-to be are 
concerned (Gilbert, 2013, p. 80). 
The reality of the group-agent, based on intrinsic conditions of agency and on the possibility 
of a single group’s aim is demonstrated. This demonstration allows the consideration of 
the interaction with the entity, like criticism, accusation etc. For example, when BP is held 
responsible for an oil spill in the Mexico City gulf, it is because it is considered as an agent that 
1.2 The logical 
possibility of the 
group-agent in 
List and Pettit’s 
works
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it can be prosecuted. This position doesn’t prevent recognizing of individual responsibilities. 
Each member of the group is individually morally responsible for the outcome of the joint 
action, but each is individually responsible jointly with the others (Miller & Makela, 2005, 
p.234). It exists a collective and an individual responsibility. They are linked but they are 
different.
Once it has been shown that the group is a full-agent in its own right, it can be held 
responsible for its actions. 
How to found the responsibility of the group and consequently of the enterprise?
To answer this question, we propose a development in two stages:
– Firstly, show that the group is a responsible agent.
– Secondly, show that the group is a kind of person; a legal person (and not a natural person), 
but a person anyway, who can therefore assume a responsibility.
The first argument starts from the definition of the prerequisites of the responsibility in an 
agent to show that the group owns them as well. Thus, like List and Pettit, we propose to 
define what makes an agent responsible from the strictest point of view (List and Pettit 2011):
1) The normative capacity which means that the agent can face significant normative choices 
involving the possibility of doing something good or bad, correct or false.
2) The judgmental ability which implies that the agent has the understanding needed to make 
judgments about options.
3) The control necessary for choice between the options.
Therefore a group of agents must fulfil these three conditions. For the normative capacity 
(1) and judgment capacity (2), since it has been shown that a group is able to organize itself 
for acting according to the pursued collective desires and that it is able to choose between 
several proposals including the vote. There can be no doubt that the group of agents is also 
able to make a choice between options. The question of control (3) is more complicated for the 
collective agent because it implies to take into account the different levels of causality and the 
different levels of attribution of responsibility. In fact, the level of responsibility of a member 
in relation to the group is not the same depending on whether they work for the group, or 
they participate in the achievement of the group’s objectives - and their level of participation. 
On this point, a distinction must be made between two levels. The first is the responsibility 
of the group that must control its own organization and assign to each member a task that 
makes sense to achieve the objectives of the organization. The second is the responsibility of 
each member to do what they have to do (List and Pettit 2011, p. 163). The group can therefore 
assume a responsibility because it is able to act in its own name. This responsibility can be 
named “shared responsibility” (Mellema, 1997).
The second argument is an argument of personification of the group, also pointed by List and 
Pettit (List and Pettit 2011). A theory exists (since 1246 with Pope Innocent IV) which states 
that a corporation, a group, may be considered responsible such as a person; a fictitious or 
artificial person, but nevertheless a person, able to assume responsibility, and who has rights. 
In our view, this is recognized in the legal framework by the term “legal person”. They are 
interested by this theory because it gets along with the defence of the previous argument, 
namely, the group’s responsibility as such a group. However, it is one thing to position 
the legal existence of the legal person from a performative point of view; it is another to 
affirm this personification as intrinsic, considering that the person must have a biological 
consistency. But, that being said, we have previously recognized that the agent-group may 
perform judgments and moral acts, it may enter into engagements with other agents, and it 
may be a source or target of requests. In addition, an agent-group is able to self-regulate. Now, 
2. Corporate social 
responsibility
2.1 Founding the 





if a group of agents can do all that, then it has to be recognized as a person because it possesses 
the basic prerequisites for personality. This positioning raises the question of respect due to 
the person. The authors specify that the natural person has more rights and deserves a higher 
respect, related to the natural rights in particular, than the legal person. Thus, List and Pettit 
affirm that the group doesn’t have the same importance, nor the same rights. In addition, the 
group must be controlled more than natural persons. Indeed, it has a greater power than the 
individual, including a power to interfere in the choices of individuals (coercion, influence, 
constraint). 
Beyond simply recognizing the responsibility of the group, this conclusion leads to stress the 
importance of making it aware of its own responsibility (Lastic, 2015). 
For natural person, the scope of their responsibility extends to themselves, and eventually 
to their children if they have any. A natural person is therefore, a priori, only responsible for 
one entity: himself. For the company, which is a legal person, the responsibility is multiple. If 
we talk about corporate responsibility, we talk about the responsibility of the group as a legal 
person. It is a collective responsibility. To better understand this responsibility and how it is 
distributed, we can analyze its stakeholders.
The issue of taking into account some stakeholders in governance quickly raises the question 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In fact, if external stakeholders, such as environment 
or the municipality in which the company operates, are associated with governance and are 
part of decision-making, then it seems that this company can be considered as being socially 
responsible because it conscientiously takes into account its social impact.
However, the problem of the respective place of firms and the state in relation to society does 
not have only one answer. Do companies have to be involved in the following problematics: 
housing, education, health, climate change, etc.? In other words, should enterprises act on 
the well being of individuals and society? The economist Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1970) is 
well known for defending the idea that the sole responsibility of the company is to maximize 
its profit and consequently the benefit for its shareholders. This position corresponds to a 
minimalist ethics or ethical egoism), which from a purely economical point of view, ensures 
that this maximization will lead to a general social welfare. In addition, Friedman argues that 
the company is not legitimate in the management of social issues because it would have a 
simple production function.
This position is contradicted by several parties who consider that the activities of the company 
generate outsourced costs on the community (pollution, accidents, unemployment...). The 
problem is then to determine who will assume those additive costs for the whole society. 
Some entities expect a social role from the company. We particularly remember Caroll’s 
theory (Caroll, 1979, p. 500) which has the merit of clarifying the notion of responsibility 
by highlighting its different aspects. Caroll states that the various components of a global 
responsibility are distributed pyramidly inside the company. Economic responsibility forms 
the fundamentals of this pyramid and obliges the company to assume its objectives of 
producing goods and services sold with profit. Then comes the legal responsibility, which 
belongs to the law. Finally, the ethical responsibility expected by the community implies to 
respect the rights of stakeholders. This latest step covers what is generally meant by corporate 
social responsibility.
Thus, in the concept of CSR, responsibility is linked to the consideration of societal 
stakeholders. The extension of its responsibility includes without any doubt social and 
ecological concerns. The model of governance induced by the network of its stakeholders 
leaves room for a debate on the extension of its social responsibility. This debate is on the 
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Does the consideration of certain stakeholders (such as environment) come under the legal or 
the moral obligation? In any case, it seems to be a vision of equity.
Collective agency implies an enterprise’s responsibility of the firm considering its social, 
environmental and economic context - as far as the company, in its economical context, has a 
strong effect on humans and their environment.
The concept of responsibility is based on both an axiological approach (values) and a political 
approach especially based on the common good’s issue (Argandoña, 1998, p.1093). 
This specific case is as much ethical as economical. It would be misleading to look at either 
approaches in isolation and we are experiencing that it could be one of the causes of financial 
and social crisis. So, while it is essential to be aware of the moral theories underlying our 
practices and to distinguish them, it also seems important not to be locked in an ethical or 
political approach. As well as the exchanges of good practices between the CSR model and 
the governance model is possible, why deprive us of alliances that would prove beneficial 
to the model involved? Governance’s ethicization and CSR’s normalization are already 
beginning to exist. They aim not to choose between economic efficiency and social efficiency, 
but to combine them for sustainable value creation. Thus, even if the environmental, 
social, societal and health topics treated by CSR seem to be historically independent of the 
theoretical model of organization’s governance, they have nonetheless an impact on the 
sustainable development’s strategy. Indeed, these factors are both endogenous and exogenous: 
endogenous because they have a direct impact on the company’s activity (for example, energy 
consumption for an industrial company), and exogenous because they have an impact on 
the local environment of the business (economic, social, environmental). The CSR model 
impacting the governance model makes it more global.
The question of mutual impact of socially responsible or non-socially responsible governance 
models arises in terms of the standardization of the one and ethicization of the other. Two 
different types of support for globalization by organizations can be distinguished: On the 
one hand, the model of CSR, necessarily including an environmental stakeholder, assuming 
responsibility for it, and thereby demonstrating its responsibility; a rather voluntary attitude 
echoing values  and an ethical attitude. On the other hand, the model of governance, which 
does not require an environmental stakeholder, of which it does not necessarily recognize 
responsibility. Its normative approach is to respect the mandatory standards. That is why 
this model implies an approach that can be described as legal, political or economic rather 
than ethical. The gradual expansion of the company’s responsibilities questions the legal 
definition of its role in public life (Even-Granboulan, 2000, ch. 7). It seems, however, that 
the responsibility assumed by the company, as a voluntary approach taken collectively and 
individually, leads to an “ethicization” of the models. In the legal world, ethics thus appears 
as a palliative to the normative vacuum. In the economic world, more and more voices are 
rising to proclaim the humanity of the homo oeconomicus who, in addition to being a moral and 
emotional being is a rational being who wishes to preserve his living conditions for future 
generations.
Thus, the standardization of certain voluntary practices, if it does not prevent the self-support 
of a responsibility, may be desirable. This analysis therefore leads to an ethical and political 
perspective of entrepreneurship.
In the research for the common good, the commons have become an absolutely central point 
of world politics. The future of humanity depends on how they will be preserved and how they 










More impacting than an individual and, most of the time, more reactive and more effective 
than a state institution, company must today take its place as a collective agent having a 
political role because, in fact, it has an impact on the world: on the natural and socio-economic 
environment and on the evolution of societal practices. Therefore, it must optimize its impact 
to make it positive, and if this is not possible and its impact proves to be negative (pollutant, 
harmful to health, energetically deplorable, etc.), it has the duty to reduce as much as possible 
and, at worst, to compensate for it. The point that crystallizes the political scale of corporate 
agents is that of the commons. Garrett Hardin introduces this notion in an article entitled 
“The tragedy of the commons”: 
“Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit -- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (...) When we use the word responsibility 
in the absence of substantial sanctions are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons 
into acting against his own interest? Responsibility is a verbal counterfeit for a substantial 
quid pro quo. It is an attempt to get something for nothing.” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244) 
The notion of responsibility or irresponsibility in relation to the commons is introduced and 
Hardin requests state sanctions to deal with them. Later, in “Governing the commons: the 
evolution of institutions for collective action”, Elinor Ostrom deals with the governance of 
the commons. Governance of natural resources is crucial from a political point of view, but 
currently neither the state nor the market, have been able to solve the problems related to 
common resources. The governance of the common resources could, according to Ostrom, be 
assured by voluntary organizations, by collectives able to take charge of the common goods in 
a wanted and collaborative way: 
“Success in starting small-scale initial institutions enables a group of individuals to build 
on the social capital thus created to solve larger problems with larger and more complex 
institutional arrangements. Current theories of collective action do not stress the process of 
accretion of institutional capital. Thus, one problem in using them as foundations for policy 
analysis is that they do not focus on the incremental self-transformations that frequently are 
involved in the process of supplying institutions. Learning is an incremental, self-transforming 
process.” (Ostrom, 2010, p. 190) 
The defence of the commons concerns companies as a group-agent but also individuals 
belonging to this group themselves. In this process, learning is central. For the agent-groups 
that are the companies this learning goes up to a duty to know, legally called “duty of 
vigilance”.
After having shown that the enterprise is a group whose agency needs to be recognized, 
we insisted that this agency brings it into the responsibility domain. This responsibility, 
commonly called “Corporate Social Responsibility”, involves a relationship with internal 
and external enterprise’s stakeholders whose natural, social and economical environments 
are parts. This aspect incurs a political role for the enterprise, in the sense that, as a human 
community’s agent, it must also seek the common good. In concrete terms, this position is 
reflected in the preservation of the common goods, called the “commons”.
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